Is the UK finally getting over the great Brexit schism?

The writer is UK director at More in Common, a think-tank

In the heat of the 2019 election it was hard to imagine Brexit wouldn’t forever dominate our national conversation. From People’s Vote marches and Boris Johnson’s bulldozer right through to family dinner table debates, the UK seemed trapped in its 52:48 Leave versus Remain divide. So dominant were those allegiances that in More in Common polling conducted in the wake of that election, half of voters told us that how they voted in the 2016 referendum was an important part of their identity — significantly more than the third who said the same about the political party they had just voted for.

Nearly four years on from Johnson’s “Get Brexit Done” campaign — and seven years after the referendum — our latest research finds those divides, which seemed a lasting schism, are softening. Not only has EU membership tumbled down the list of important issues from first to 11th (and almost never comes up unprompted in our focus groups), but the number who say Brexit is an important part of their identity has fallen from 50 per cent to 39 per cent. Political allegiance has become once again a more important marker.

And that Brexit depolarisation has not been symmetrical. After the 2019 election, Leavers and Remainers were equally likely to say their Brexit vote was important to their identity. But now, the number of Leavers saying it is important has fallen by 19 points, while among Remain voters it has fallen by just four points. So what persists about Brexit identity is largely being driven by Remainers.

Why is this? An obvious reason is that we did ultimately leave the EU; defending the status quo arouses less passion than a campaign. But our research suggests a more important driver of that asymmetry — the perception that Brexit has, so far, been a failure.

Nearly two-thirds of voters in our research, including almost half of Leave voters, say that Brexit has been unsuccessful. Were a new referendum to be held today, Britons would vote to rejoin by a margin of 58:42 — with one in seven Leavers switching their vote.

Politicians have noticed this shift. While the Conservatives can’t risk upsetting their Brexiter wing by proposing more co-operation with the EU, recent noises from the Labour front bench pointing to a closer relationship — while ruling out customs union or single market membership — are a nod to the changing public mood.

But the greatest impact of weakening Leave allegiance is likely to be seen on domestic politics — and it’s bad news for the Conservatives. At the heart of their 2019 support was a group of socially conservative but economically left-leaning voters who had traditionally backed Labour. This group switched to the Tories, powering their victories in seats across the north and Midlands in what has become known as the red wall — in large part because of Brexit.

As Brexit allegiance frays and the economy regains its role as the supreme political driver, this group aren’t just voicing “Bregret” — they increasingly display “Torygret” too. Concern about inflation and interest rates coupled with worrying about the NHS mean that the group who once seemed set to be the new Tory base are instead registering the biggest swing away from the governing party.

This electoral woe is compounded by Remain identities proving more enduring. That stickiness prevents the Tories from making up for losses in the red wall by winning back some of the traditional Conservatives who drifted away after Brexit. This group rather likes Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, in contrast to his predecessors, but the wider toxicity of the Tory brand acts as a barrier to voting for the party again.

Electoral realignments are a double-edged sword — in 2019, Brexit effects on voting patterns benefited the Conservatives. At the next election, the opposite could be true. And the change is happening faster and in other ways than we might have predicted.