Ukraine won the ‘geek war’ but it wasn’t enough on the front line

When Russian forces launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly a year ago, Ukrainian soldiers and citizens alike flooded social media with videos of the country’s exploits against the Russian army. Clips of Ukrainian soldiers shooting down Russian aircraft or neutralising enemy tanks circulated on Twitter and Telegram. 

As drone and GoPro footage of fighting flooded social media sites, defence analysts rushed to praise Ukraine’s use of civilian technology and ability to jury-rig equipment on the fly. From the sinking of Russia’s flagship Moskva, to the use of drones and exploding, low-tech boats in the Black Sea, Ukraine’s hardware ingenuity earned praises across the world.

But as Ukraine braces for new spring and summer offensives, President Volodymyr Zelensky has stepped up his pleas for Western tanks, ammunition and even fighter jets, hammering home the need for heavy military equipment, and the insufficiency of DIY weapons against Russia.

What happened to the retrofitted drones, the “high-tech army” that was supposed to repel the invader? Is the hardware ingenuity and creativity that the Ukrainians displayed in the first months of the conflict, no longer relevant?  

Waiting for Western aid

“During the war, it’s true that, for example, whenever new drones were used, there were articles proclaiming the changing face of the conflict. We’ve seen that this was an exaggeration of the impact of technology,” said Dominika Kunertova, a specialist in the militarisation of emerging technologies at the Centre for Security Studies of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich).

The Ukrainian DIY system played an important role in the first phase of the conflict, when Russia hoped to swiftly subdue Ukraine. “Kyiv did not have Western logistical support at the time and had to rely on its own limited resources,” said Huseyn Aliyev, an expert on the Ukraine-Russia conflict at Glasgow University.

Back then, Ukraine had to turn to the lessons learned since Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the fighting against pro-Russia separatists in the Donbas. “They already knew how to use drones, as they had been using them since 2015-2016 for reconnaissance purposes with the advice of NATO trainers,” Aliyev noted. 

The Ukrainian army had to deploy drones on a large scale as it faced a numerically superior enemy streaming towards Kyiv. Faced with a shortage of military UAV’s, Ukraine’s forces had to rely on other means, hence the use of civilian drones, modified to meet war demands. Images of Ukrainian soldiers hanging grenades on easily available commercial drone models were a staple in the early days of the war.

“The use of drones in a conflict is not new, but what’s new is the scale of their use,” said Kunertova.

The Ukrainian army deployed drones to conduct reconnaissance operations in order to accurately aim its artillery. “Usually, in wartime, we think of large drones that can be used to fire missiles. The Ukrainians have instead opted for small models integrated into combat devices in order to save ammunition. Before the drones, we risked soldiers’ lives by sending them on reconnaissance missions,” Kunertova explained. 

Not just drones

Ukraine’s DIY solutions were not just limited to drones. “They have shown a lot of creativity in the military doctrine used against the Russians,” Aliyev explained. “The Ukrainian army has organised itself “into small, highly mobile units capable of approaching Russian forces and striking quickly,” he added.

To do this, Kyiv has developed apps, or diverted them from their original purpose, to better communicate and coordinate the front line. The case of “Diïa”, an app initially created in 2020 to store dematerialised versions of official documents such as passports, is an example of Ukrainian ingenuity. The app was transformed into a platform to share enemy movements, giving practical information and alerting soldiers to events, like Russian shelling locations.

This DIY technique “clearly gave Ukraine an advantage because the Russians were caught off guard and had to adapt to these unorthodox methods,” said Aliyev. The Russian army, a vertical hierarchical organisation, was slow to react, which in turn slowed its advance. This creativity helped Kyiv to “hold out while waiting for Western logistical support”, he added.

Technology was also effectively used in the mobilisation effort. “The emphasis at the beginning of the war on the importance of emerging technologies was also an important factor in mobilising Ukrainians,” said Aliyev.

Historically, Ukraine served as a breeding ground for Soviet engineers. In the post-USSR period, Ukraine developed a digital culture, working for Russian IT companies as well as Western ones, in English, according to the Financial Times.

When the Ukrainian government called for the creation of a “digital army” at the start of the conflict, “it was as much to defend against Russian cyber attacks as to show that everyone could participate in the war effort, which was very important for public morale,” said Aliyev.

War does not need the latest technology

After Moscow’s initial blitzkrieg plan failed, the DIY tech system showed its limits. “The use of drones and apps was very effective in spotting weak points in moving Russian army columns. But as soon as the front line froze, these small, highly mobile units proved less useful in the face of entrenched and alert Russian troops,” said Aliyev.

Meanwhile, Moscow has also realised the importance of drones and bought large quantities from Iran. However, the Russians used them more as prowler or loitering munitions [kamikaze drones] and less for reconnaissance missions, according to Kunertova. 

But in recent months, the conflict entered a static phase which once again saw the use of technological creativity. “The Ukrainians have, for example, started to build portable rocket launchers. They have managed to install them on civilian vehicles to improve their firepower,” said Aliyev notes.

Even if emerging technologies are no longer considered a priority for Ukraine, this war has already proven their importance in conflicts, according to Kunertova. “This war made us understand that developing technologies do not need to be high-tech to be useful on the battlefield. Moreover, it’s the way they are used that can make all the difference,” she said. 

More worryingly, the conflict has also “demonstrated how easy it is to turn commercial technologies into weapons,” said Kunertova. The line between combatants and civilians is now more blurred because of the use of cheap, easily available technology in war. Is a civilian who uses his smartphone to share enemy positions that he see from home with the army, still a civilian? That, as a Wired magazine article noted in June 2022, is a key question that will have to be decided soon.

(This is a translation of the original in French.)